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RESPONSE TO SANFORD LEVINSON: WHO COUNTS?—THE 
POLITICS OF RACIAL MEMBERSHIP AND EXCOMMUNICATION 
RANDALL KENNEDY* 
I had occasion recently to describe Sanford Levinson as “the most 
adventurous, independent, and wide-ranging intellectual in the American legal 
academy.”1 His Childress Lecture supports my claim. Its breadth, candor, 
incisiveness, suggestiveness, and passion is definitely Levinsonian. He begins 
by asking “who counts” as part of “we” the American people. He muses about 
possible indicia of Americanness and which people or what institutions 
determine and should determine who is inside and who is outside of the 
American political family. From there he proceeds to explore boundary-setting 
controversies that have embroiled other collectives—religious groups (i.e., 
who is a Catholic or a Jew), tribal groups (i.e., who is Cherokee or Pueblo), 
and even gender groups (who is a woman or a man). 
Inspired by Levinson, I want to explore certain boundary-setting 
controversies that have attended competing conceptions of what it means to be 
“black” in America. Using the Levinsonian idiom, I ask, “who counts” as black 
and “sez who”—who does and should do the counting? 
Within the African-American intelligentsia, issues of racial identity, 
authenticity, and obligation have elicited much attention. A provocative 
addition to this discussion is Who’s Afraid of Post-Blackness: What It Means 
to Be Black Now, by Touré (Neblett). Touré assails “self-appointed identity 
cops” who write “Authenticity Violations as if they were working for Internal 
Affairs making sure everyone does Blackness in the right way.”2 His aim is to 
“destroy the idea that there is a correct or legitimate way of doing Blackness,” 
maintaining that “[i]f there’s a right way then there must be a wrong way, and 
that [that] kind of thinking cuts us off from exploring the full potential of 
Black humanity.”3 Touré claims that he wants African-Americans to have the 
freedom to be black in whatever ways they choose and that he aspires “to 
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banish from the collective mind the bankrupt, fraudulent concept of ‘authentic’ 
Blackness.”4 
“Post-Blackness” is the label Touré deploys to describe the sensibility he 
champions, a “modern individualistic Blackness” that enthusiastically endorses 
novelty and diversity, fluidity and experimentation.5 Post-Black, he insists, “is 
not a box, it’s an unbox. It opens the door to everything. It’s open-ended and 
open-source and endlessly customizable. It’s whatever you want it to be.”6 
Touré is right to be concerned about fears of racial disloyalty and their 
sequelae. The specter of defection and subversion occupies a salient place in 
the African-American mind and soul.7 It figures in novels (for example, Ralph 
Ellison’s Invisible Man8), in films (for example, Spike Lee’s Bamboozled9), 
and in hip-hop (for example, the Geto Boys’ No Sellout10). It prompts such 
questions as whether blacks have an obligation to reside in “the hood,” marry 
within the race, or decline certain roles such as being a prosecutor. These fears 
are echoed in incantations such as, “Don’t forget where you come from,” and, 
“Stay black.” They are glimpsed in obsessive scrutiny of prominent blacks for 
evidence of inadequate commitment to black solidarity. These fears prompt 
blacks, especially those in elite, predominantly white settings, to signal 
conspicuously their allegiance to Blackness. This angst contributes to the rise 
of what journalist John Blake terms the “Soul Patrol,” a clique of black folk 
“who impose their definition of blackness on other black people.”11 The Soul 
Patrol, Blake complains, is not content with choosing your friends.12 “They 
want to tell you how to think, where to live, whom to love, how to do your 
job.”13 
Touré writes metaphorically of “identity cops” who “mak[e] sure everyone 
does Blackness in the right way.”14 There is, however, an actual book self-
consciously devoted to this mission. It is a remarkable, albeit obscure, volume 
entitled The American Directory of Certified Uncle Toms: Being a Review of 
the History, Antics, and Attitudes of Handkerchief Heads, Aunt Jemimas, Head 
Negroes in Charge, and House Negroes Against the Freedom Aims of the 
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Black Race.15 The collective that compiled this Directory calls itself the 
“Council on Black Internal Affairs.”16 It was formed “as a result of the Million 
Man March to monitor the progress of the Black race.”17 According to the 
Council, nothing more impedes this progress than Uncle Toms (and the female 
equivalent, Aunt Jemimas).18 The Uncle Tom, the Council asserts, “repudiates 
strong Black leadership,” and, for this service to the white power structure, “is 
anointed as a ‘responsible leader’ and praised as ‘one of the good ones.’”19 The 
Council contends, however, that the Uncle Toms’ immunity is ending. 
According to the Council, Uncle Toms—“non-practicing Black[s]”—will 
increasingly face sanctions from “practicing Black[s]” who conscientiously 
fulfill the responsibilities of racial citizenship.20 
The Council’s list of Uncle Toms and Aunt Jemimas is long and varied. It 
includes Julian Bond and John Lewis (too close to white benefactors of civil 
rights initiatives), Colin Powell and Clarence Thomas (too close to white 
Republicans), Mary Frances Berry and Vernon Jordan (too close to white 
Democrats), Harry Belafonte and Henry Louis Gates, Jr. (too close to white 
women), and Oprah Winfrey and Maya Angelou (too close to white 
audiences).21 Given what the Council demands in order to be considered a 
practicing black in good standing—isolation from the perceived contamination 
of influential whites—updated editions of the Directory will likely list—black 
list—many of today’s leading African-American public figures, including 
President Barack Obama. 
Touré rightly assails principles, strategies, or tactics that impose wrongful 
constraints. He rightly opposes the dogmatism, authoritarianism, and hankering 
for marginality that blights the thinking of all narrow ideologues found in far-
flung precincts in Black America—the sort who habitually challenge the racial 
bona fides of practically any Negro who wins trans-racial acclaim.22 Touré 
errs, however, when he adopts a stance of libertarian absolutism according to 
which it is always wrong for one black person to question another black 
person’s fidelity to Black America.23 This is the stance taken by Professor 
Stephen L. Carter in Reflections of an Affirmative Action Baby, where he 
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writes that “[l]oving our people and loving our culture does not require any 
restriction on what black people can think or say or do or be.”24 
No restriction? Consider the case of William Hannibal Thomas, a black 
man born free in Ohio in 1843, who wrote The American Negro: What He 
Was, What He Is, and What He May Become: A Critical and Practical 
Discussion.25 This was one of the most Negrophobic diatribes ever published, a 
tract in which Thomas wrote that “negro intelligence is both superficial and 
delusive”; that the Negro “lives wholly in his passions, and is never so happy 
as when enveloped in the glitter and gloss of shams”; that the Negro 
“represents an intrinsically inferior type of humanity”; that Negroes “have not 
learned the elementary principles of moral conduct”; and that Negro men 
“have an inordinate craving for carnal knowledge of white women.”26 He 
recommended that Blacks be whipped as punishment for minor crimes and 
defended Jim Crow segregation.27 Demanding “the utter extermination, root 
and branch, of all negroid beliefs and practices,” he suggested that an optimal 
way of handling the “negro problem” would be to remove black children from 
their parents and place them in orphanages in which they could be raised by 
white guardians.28 
With virtual unanimity, blacks excoriated The American Negro and 
shunned its author.29 Blacks in Memphis, Tennessee, living under the threat of 
lynchings that Thomas implicitly justified, held “an indignation meeting” at 
which they warned Thomas that he risked physical assault if he ever dared set 
foot in their city.30 Charles W. Chesnutt compared Thomas’s “traitorous blow” 
unfavorably to the infamies of Judas and Benedict Arnold.31 
Booker T. Washington concluded his negative review of The American 
Negro by remarking: “It is sad to think of a man without a country. It is sadder 
to think of a man without a race.”32 J. Max Barber, the editor of The Voice of 
the Negro, declared, “Negro children ought to be taught to spit upon 
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[Thomas’s] name.”33 A minister urged Thomas to “go off and hang thyself,”34 
while another critic insisted that “death is too good for him.”35 
Was this outraged response wrong? Was this reaction “political 
correctness” run amok? Should African-Americans have accepted Thomas’s 
ranting as just another flavor of Blackness—a mere voicing of opinion that 
must, as a matter of principle, be left alone to rise or fall depending upon its 
performance in the marketplace of ideas? No. No. And no. Some ideas ought 
to be stifled. Determining what ideas should meet that fate under what 
circumstances and by what means are large, complex, daunting questions that 
warrant the most careful attention. The world is awash with destructive 
censorship. And the cultural freedom that has been painstakingly won in the 
United States is a treasure for which Americans should be willing to fight. At 
the same time, it bears repeating that, under some circumstances, people 
behaving in certain ways, including the expression of certain ideas, ought to be 
repressed. 
In an article revealingly titled The Virulence of Blackthink and How Its 
Threat of Ostracism Shackles Those Deemed Not Black Enough, Washington 
University Law Professor Kimberly Jade Norwood asserts that “there is no 
more important freedom than the freedom to think and to believe based upon 
personal conviction—no matter how unpopular that belief or conviction.”36 
This boundless libertarian claim appears to be sound, even noble, until put 
under pressure. Does one really want to embrace unconditionally the 
proposition Professor Norwood advances? What about the personal conviction 
that slavery or extermination is the proper destiny for certain peoples? I am 
willing to permit room for such thoughts—so long as I am confident that 
circumstances doom them to irrelevance. But, if a belief in the rightness of 
slavery or genocide had any plausible chance of growing, gaining adherents, 
and rising to power, I would favor immediately suppressing it. One can be 
against the imposition of “Blackthink” and other obnoxious herd mentalities 
without embracing the proposition that any expression, no matter how 
dangerous, should, in principle, be immune from suppression. Not all blacklists 
or other modes of censorship are bad. 
One should be appalled by the pettiness, narrowness, bigotry, and 
dictatorial character of those, like the Council on Black Internal Affairs, who 
have intermittently afflicted Negroes with destructive bouts of internecine 
tyranny. Often those who have been most militant in insisting upon black unity 
are those who have been most cruel and thoughtless in thrusting perceived 
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apostates outside the fold. I think here of the purgings committed by 
proponents of Marcus Garvey’s Universal Negro Improvement Association, 
Elijah Muhammad’s Nation of Islam, and H. Rap Brown’s Student Non-
Violent Coordinating Committee.37 “We’ve all heard and felt,” Touré 
observes, “the Blackness police among us judging and convicting and 
sentencing and verbally or mentally casting people out of the race for large and 
small offenses.”38 
Touré’s response is to so broaden the boundaries of Blackness that no 
black person can properly be “convicted” of straying outside. In this post-
Black era, Touré writes, “the number of ways of being Black is infinite. . . . 
[T]he possibilities for an authentic Black identity are boundless.”39 According 
to Touré, “Blackness is not a club you can be expelled from.”40 
There are several problems with this position. First, Touré himself does not 
fully believe in the unbounded conceptions of Blackness or post-Blackness that 
he sometimes seems to propound. “Our community,” he writes, “is too diverse, 
complex, imaginative, dynamic, fluid, creative, and beautiful to impose 
restraints on Blackness.”41 To what, however, does he refer to when he says 
“our”? For “our” to have meaning it must have some boundary that separates 
“us” from “them.” If post-Black opens the door to everything, does that mean 
that anyone can rightly be deemed “Black”? Just suppose Glenn Beck and Bill 
O’Reilly, as a joke, declared themselves to be Black. If there really are no 
restraints on Blackness, no boundaries distinguishing “Blacks” from “non-
Blacks,” then it follows that there would be no basis on which to deny their 
claim. That, in my view, would be unsatisfactory—an indication that the 
thinking in question is flawed. 
Touré and his allies seek to escape fundamental aspects of any community 
and coordinated collective action: boundaries and discipline. What Professor 
Levinson’s endlessly fascinating catalogue of disputations indicates, however, 
is that every community—be it a family, firm, tribe, denomination, or nation-
state—necessarily has boundaries that distinguish members from non-
members.42 
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supra at 277, 300. 
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 40. Id. at 24. 
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One could opt to end “Blackness” by eschewing racial categories. One 
could reject affiliations that are organized around racial identity. William 
Whipper (1804–1876) urged African-Americans to reject any racial labels that 
set them apart from other Americans.43 At the national black convention of 
1835, he proposed a resolution (that passed), which urged Negroes to abandon 
the use of the word “colored” or “African” when describing themselves.44 
Presumably, had he thought of it, Whipper would also have urged dispensing 
with “Black.” According to Whipper, “We have too long witnessed the baneful 
effects of distinctions founded in hatred and prejudice, to advocate the 
insertion of either the word ‘white’ or ‘colored.’”45 He maintained that the 
label “oppressed Americans” was a better tool of self-perception and public 
presentation than any expressly racial label.46 
Whipper’s tradition lives. One sees it in the efforts of Ward Connerly and 
others to scrap racial affirmative action, to do away with racial labels, and to 
stop collecting data categorized by race.47 
Touré, however, does not affiliate himself with this tradition. He is a race 
man who lauds inter-racial openness as, among other things, a means of getting 
ahead. Hence, he praises “Black people who can make the leap to loving and 
trusting white people” because these African-Americans “have far more ability 
[than others] to climb the ladders of power.”48 
Aware that some African-Americans will see in his belief an ugly ethic of 
racial brownnosing, Touré seeks a general truce whereby blacks forgo judging 
the racial politics of one another. But that aim is futile; judgment is inevitable. 
Touré claims to accept as equally “Black” all beliefs advanced by African-
Americans.49 But he himself does not really believe this. He insists repeatedly, 
for instance, that he is no “oreo”—an inauthentic Negro, black on the outside, 
but white on the inside.50 In saying that he is not an “oreo,” however, Touré 
concedes that someone is. Despite occasional feints to the contrary, he does not 
repudiate the idea of the “oreo” per se; he simply maintains that he should not 
be seen as one. 
Improper policing is indeed an evil to avoid. But policing, per se, is part of 
the unavoidable cost of maintaining a group. That is why all nations have 
criminal laws, including prohibitions against treason. To the extent that one 
wants to perpetuate black communities but eschew racial policing, one seeks a 
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sociological impossibility. The erection of boundaries and the threat of 
expulsion are inescapable, albeit dangerous, aspects of any collective 
enterprise. 
That danger becomes more evident when one moves from generality to the 
particularity of a named individual. Consider the case of Justice Clarence 
Thomas—the most vilified Black official in American history, a jurist whose 
very name has become synonymous with selling out.51 
Is it right for Blacks to cast Thomas from their communion? Is it 
appropriate to indict him for betrayal? These questions have arisen on 
numerous occasions over the past several decades. In confronting them now, I 
conclude that I have erred in the past. Previously, I have criticized Thomas’s 
performance as a jurist—his acceptance of, or contribution to, policies or 
decisions that unjustly harm racial minorities, gays and lesbians, and others 
tragically vulnerable to ingrained prejudices.52 But I have also chastised those 
who sought to make him persona non grata in any gathering of Black folk. In 
1998, for example, Judge A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., petitioned the National 
Bar Association (the black analogue to the American Bar Association) to 
rescind an invitation for Thomas to speak that had been extended by one of its 
officials.53 Judge Higginbotham argued that in light of the harm being done by 
Thomas to Black America, it was wrong to honor him with a platform that 
would further legitimate and amplify his opinions.54 The NBA rejected 
Higginbotham’s counsel and allowed Thomas to speak—a decision I defended 
at the time.55 Alienated by the rhetoric of some of his detractors—for instance, 
publicly expressed wishes for his early death56—I joined those who maintained 
that granting a podium to Thomas would contribute to public understanding 
and perhaps elicit from him a more respectful attentiveness to opposing views. 
I also joined those who contended that it was wrong to question Thomas’s 
racial bona fides. 
I was a sap. 
The notion that Clarence Thomas is seriously interested in debate is 
laughable. He seeks monologues, not dialogues. He seeks legitimacy-
enhancing stages and props—preferably star-struck black children—not open 
forums that facilitate candid and informed exchange. Most importantly, Justice 
Thomas consistently votes in ways that are profoundly detrimental to the 
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interests of Black America. Professor Levinson rightly castigates the Supreme 
Court majority for “relentless[ly] assault[ing]” the Voting Rights Act of 
1965.57 Thomas is in the forefront of that assault, as well as others others that 
target hard-won achievements of the Second Reconstruction and subsequent 
mobilizations. For that egregious wrongheadedness, Thomas ought to be 
penalized harshly. African-Americans en masse should put him outside of 
respectful affiliation with Black folk. 
Many blacks reject the idea that an African-American can ever properly be 
dismissed from the race—“de-blacked” to use the memorable term coined by 
Professor Norwood.58 How one stands on this matter depends on how one 
conceptualizes racial membership. Some view racial membership as an 
immutable status—you are born black and that is it. I do not. I view choice as 
an integral element of membership. In my view, a person (or at least an adult 
person) should be Black by choice, with a recognized right of resignation. 
Carrying through with that contractualist conception, I also believe that a 
Black should have no immunity from being de-Blacked. Any Negro should be 
subject to having his or her membership in Blackness revoked if he or she 
pursues a course of conduct that convincingly demonstrates the absence of 
even a minimal communal allegiance. 
Touré declares, “Blackness is not a club you can be expelled from.”59 But 
why should that be so? Religions impose excommunication. Nations revoke 
citizenship. Parents disown children. Why, as a matter of principle, should 
Blacks be disallowed from casting from their community those adjudged to be 
enemies of it? The power of expulsion is so weighty that prudence should 
demand extraordinary care in exercising it. Still, the power to exclude and 
expel is, and should be, part of what constitutes Black America. 
Unlike the United States, Black America lacks mechanisms of 
sovereignty—courts, for example—that can provide centralized, authoritative, 
and enforceable judgments regarding membership. In Black America, only an 
amorphous public opinion adjudicates such matters, generating inconclusive 
results. Nonetheless, Black public opinion should and does exercise some 
control over Black America’s communal boundary, determining in the process 
a person’s standing as member, guest, or enemy. 
Racial solidarity will always depend to some extent on self-appointed 
monitors of racial virtue. Touré himself is a monitor. His chiding of Black 
political correctness is itself a variant of Black political correctness. Those who 
want to maintain Black community while condemning the peer pressure that 
makes collective action possible must recognize that solidarity always poses a 
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problem of tension between unity and freedom. Professor Levinson’s Childress 
Lecture memorably reveals the ubiquity and insolubility of this dilemma. 
 
